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Abstract. Public attitudes toward immigrants in contemporary Russia 
are rather negative and significantly more hostile than in European countries. 
To trace the relationship between attitudes toward migrants and their repre-
sentation in the media and political discourse I turn to the Russian mass media 
as one of the meaning-making factories in the society. As a database to evaluate 
whether there has been a change in stereotyping of migrants in the mass media 
over the recent decade, I utilize the newspapers sub-corpus of the Russian Na-
tional Corpus. On the basis of a content-analysis of 254,000 texts from 2008 to 
2014 I conclude about both official and popular dissociations of migrants with 
the idea of ‘ethnic criminality’ in the period after 2010.On the popular level, 
the association between ethnicity and criminality has declined, even though 
references to ethnic groups and migrants increased over the same period of time.
Keywords: migrants, public discourse, ethnic stereotypes, ethnic crime, 
Russia
Introduction
Previous research has shown that public attitudes toward immigrants 
in contemporary Russia are rather negative and significantly more hostile 
than in European countries [Gudkov, 2006; Pain, 2007; Malinkin, 2013; Iaki-
mova & Menshikov, 2019]. Scholars identify the prevalence of xenophobic 
attitudes among Russians on the level of more than 60 % and characterize 
it as a quite stable across all social strata over the recent decade [Laruelle, 
2009; Gorodzeisky, Glikman & Maskileyson, 2015].
The prevalence of negative sentiment toward migrants and ethnic ste-
reotypes is also evidenced by national opinion polls, which recorded a very 
high level of xenophobia amidst the population. In August 2020, for instance, 
73 percent of Russian survey participants stated that the influx of labour mi-
grants into the country should be limited [Levada-Center, 2020]. Respondents 
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regularly report that members of other nationalities bring with them more 
problems than solutions for the country. Official state data showing that 
migrants are no more likely to commit crimes than the supposedly ‘native’ 
population flatly contradicts this assumed connection [Dmitrieva, 2013]. 
Nevertheless, migrantophobia is widespread among even liberally-inclined 
Russians, as well as strong among more conservative circles. It is exactly 
the ability to unite such an impressive scope of public opinion that explains 
rallies against migrants in more liberal Russian cities (like Ekaterinburg and 
St. Petersburg) at the same time as pseudo-pogroms in the Moscow suburb 
of Biryulevo-West and Arzamas. Emil’ Pain called this ‘negative consoli-
dation’ the only unifying basis for Russian society in its current condition 
[cited by RBC.ru, 2013].
Similarly, Kozhevnikova [2008] highlighted the utility of anti-migrant 
rhetoric to electoral campaigns in Russia, providing a resource with which pol-
iticians mobilized their electorates. The political practice of recent years shows 
that ethnicity became one of the most overt ways of mobilizing the electorate, 
so everyday problems often acquired the semblance of inter-ethnic clashes. 
The conflicts of Russians with external migrants, as well as internal (from 
the North Caucasus) are associated in many cases with the unresolved prob-
lems of crime, shadow employment, and corruption. In order to shift public 
discontent onto a convenient scapegoat, the authorities often contrive to depict 
these conflicts as ethnic in origin. By constantly reporting data on the growth 
of crime connected with migrants (especially in Moscow), the authorities 
manipulate public opinion and incite panic in the population.
Migrants in the media and political discourse
The mass media provides an opportunity to evaluate the relationship 
between the representation of migrants in the media and political discourse 
and attitudes toward them spread amidst the population. To trace this rela-
tionship, we turn to the Russian mass media —  one of the meaning-making 
factories in any society, although perhaps especially in contemporary Russia.
Indeed, studies of the Russian press [see, for example, Peshkova, 2004] 
found that, in the first decade of the new millennium, reporting often fea-
tured migrants connected to criminal activity or conflicts. By casting cultural 
difference as the cause of social conflict, the mass media hailed migrants into 
the position of threat.
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This was even more stark in the work of Vesnina [2010], who investigated 
the use of military metaphors when referring to migrants. In the framework 
of this metaphor, articles referred to migrants as foreign (‘insidious moun-
taineers’; ‘Azeris’; ‘Churka’; and ‘cross-eyed’), as invaders (‘horde’; ‘legion’; 
and even ‘army’) and as coming to Russia ‘to fight for a place in the Sun’. 
Interactions between locals and migrants were described using similar mil-
itary metaphors, such as ‘occupying’, ‘storming’, ‘conquering’, and ‘capturing’. 
Thus, when the lines ‘some urban spaces are already captured’ appears, it 
becomes possible for those acting against the presence of migrants to be 
‘liberating’ an urban space or raising ‘protective barriers’. Migrants become 
hostile enemies against whom various kinds of resistance are warranted, or 
even demanded. When inter-ethnic relations become viewed through the lens 
provided by such discourse, it is not surprising that violence is the result.
In the first decade of the 2000s, visibly different foreign labor migrants 
who come to Russia predominantly from Central Asia (Tajikistan, Uzbeki-
stan and Kyrgyzstan) were mostly represented negatively in the media. This 
happened not necessarily because journalists or media presenters are hostile 
to migrants but because (1) the specific topics of news involving migrants 
(mostly crime reports); (2) the language used (commonly involving deroga-
tory comments); and finally (3) the headlines (provocative and often scary). 
Research on the media discourse in Russia shows that publications that 
mention migrants primarily deal with cases where migrants violate the law 
or are involved in criminal acts. Such texts depicted migrants as ‘drug dealers’, 
‘criminals’, or a ‘menace’ even when their activity is legal [Iakimova, 2015].
Similarly, texts alluding to migrants represented them as a ‘threat to na-
tional security’, for example ‘the number of migrants is getting larger, so that 
in the future they might outnumber the indigenous population’, or ‘migrants 
are culturally distant, they do not want to integrate and are poorly adapted’. 
Finally, the headlines of some news pieces about migrants speak for them-
selves: ‘Drugs Were Burned’, ‘Contraband Came from China’, ‘Hashish Was 
Transported by Trucks’, ‘Poppy Seeds Were Transported in Sacks’, ‘Choked 
to Death by Duct Tape’, ‘We Are Already Not Numerous Enough’, and so 
forth. These texts disseminate latent negative assessments of migrants through 
dichotomous oppositions; the use of stereotypical images of legal and illegal 
employment of migrants such as ‘gastarbeiters’, ‘low-level workers’, ‘drug cou-
riers’. Other standard phrases with negative overtones include, for example, 
‘illegal immigrants’, ‘ethnic and cultural closure’, and ‘cultural detachment’, 
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as well as combinations of words that emphasize foreignness, for instance, 
‘native of Tajikistan’ [Iakimova, 2015, 130]. Thus, the media extends negative 
attitudes toward migrants even without mentioning criminal activity directly.
Seemingly demonstrating awareness of the rise in xenophobic attitudes, 
the government has recently worked against the production of negative 
images. First, on the official plane, the government has worked to prevent 
the automatic conflation of ethnicity with criminality. As early as in Decem-
ber 2012, Putin claimed that he endorsed a legislative initiative proposed 
by the Moscow City Duma to ban the media from referring to the national 
origin or religious affiliation of those taken in custody, arrested or convicted. 
Putin argued:‘Criminals do not have nationality. <…>What difference does 
the ethnic group of a person who violated the law make?’ He added that ‘It 
is necessary for this legislative initiative to pass through the relevant formal 
procedures. I do not want to intervene, but if a final version of the law, ac-
cepted by the State Duma, reaches me, I am likely to support it’ [Interfax, 
2012]. While laudable in its’ own right, the fact that such a bill was not 
enthusiastically supported earlier is concerning.
A similar legislative initiative had, in fact, been first proposed by the 
‘United Russia’ faction of the Moscow City Duma in September 2006. 
At the time, the legislators claimed that due to the law, ‘journalists will not 
be involved in unintentionally constructing an enemy image of immigrants’ 
[SOVA, 2006a]. Further, the City Duma’s speaker, Vladimir Platonov, em-
phasized that there is not any connection between nationality and crime, 
claiming that references to particular ethnic groups in the media actually 
provokes ethnic/national hatred and hostility towards them [SOVA, 2006b]. 
There was thus at least tacit recognition at the administrative level that 
the association of minorities with criminal actions was creating a hostile 
environment. The lack of regime support for such an uncontroversial bill 
suggests that tackling xenophobia was not a prime concern for the regime, 
despite its very notable position in contemporary Russian life.
Further, the authorities have sometimes sought to legitimize their ac-
tions through appeal to this very criminal image. Such images were present 
once again in the authorities’ reaction to the Matveevskii market affair in 
2013. The open-air Matveevskii market in Moscow saw North Caucasian 
migrants beat a police officer to death when he came to arrest a Dagestani 
man accused of raping a 15-year old girl. The attack allegedly exposed some 
of the connections between organized ethnic criminal gangs and the au-
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thorities, as the officer’s colleagues did nothing when the merchants began 
their bloody assault. Just as interesting, however, was the Russian authorities’ 
reaction to the events, namely to investigate criminal links between the police 
and migrant traders while simultaneously denouncing an inherent connection 
between migrants and crime.
To quote Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov ‘there’s only one rele-
vant dimension here: The presence or absence of crime. If there is a crime, 
the ethnic identity of the perpetrator doesn’t matter. It is obvious —  and 
the President has mentioned this —  that ethnic crime does not exist’ [Sama-
rina, 2013]. On the one hand Peskov’s statements can be understood as tacit 
recognition that such talk of criminality contributes to generating ethnic 
violence (which is presumably why he downplays it). On the other, the active 
involvement of senior Russian officials in de-emphasizing the ethnic identity 
of criminals marks an approach which had, at least officially, become more 
common after 2010. Was there a corresponding decline in the popular por-
trayal of ethnically different migrants?
Methodology
To evaluate whether there had been a change in the association of ethnic 
minorities with crime in the mass media, we performed a content analysis 
of the Russian print media. As a database we used the newspapers sub-corpus 
of the Russian National Corpus [www.ruscorpora.ru] which is a reference 
system based on an electronic collection of texts in Russian. The National 
Corpus is created specifically for academic research and has two benefits 
which make it ideal for this enterprise. First, it is representative of actual 
newspapers in Russian society. Second, the corpus contains additional in-
formation on the properties of included texts. The newspaper sub-corpus 
began in the 2000s and contains 433,373 text items. It is represented by seven 
media resources: four print newspapers (Izvestiya, Sovetskyi Sport, Trud, 
and Komsomolskaya Pravda) and three electronic resources (RIA‑Novosti, 
RBK, and Novyi Region). Unfortunately, at the time frame of our research, 
the database only possessed data up to 2014, but we judged this sufficient 
to evaluate the role of the media in the formation of particular stereotypes. 
Such a wide array of texts and resources thus constitutes a comprehensive 
sample of the media over this time period. The dataset for each year con-
tained approximately the same number of text items (apart from 2014). We 
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examined 45,363 documents in 2008; 43, 667 in 2009; 43,947 in 2010; 39,107 
in 2011; 37,172 in 2012; 34,026 in 2013; and 10,417 in 2014.
Results and Discussion
Table 1 shows that between 2008 and 2011 the media demonstrated a sta-
ble interest in the issue of migration, but in 2012 it began increasing rapidly 
and in 2013 displayed about 3 percent (1,091 text items) out of all pieces 
of media texts in the National Corpus (more than one and a half the corre-
sponding figure for the preceding year). At the same time, for the naming 
of migrants the number of terms with a neutral connotation is higher than 
the number of terms which give migrants a derogatory connotation, and 
even more so —  with a negative one (see Table 1).
Table 1
The naming of migrants in text items, 2008–2014
Year
Neutral connation Derogatory conno-tation
Negative connota-
tion
Migrant (s) Gastarbeiter (s) Illegal (s)





2008 .44 196 .35 157 .14 63
2009 .56 244 .38 165 .18 78
2010 .42 182 .30 128 .23 99
2011 .51 199 .38 147 .23 88
2012 .85 316 .55 204 .29 108
2013 1.87 635 .81 273 .54 183
2014 1.34 139 .44 45 .33 34
The number of textual items related to the ethnicity of internal and for-
eign migrants also demonstrates an interesting pattern: if until 2009–2010 
migrants from Central Asia —  Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (external migrants) 
were mentioned more often than migrants from Caucasus (internal migrants), 
in 2010–2011 this trend changed as issues related to migrants from the Cau-
casus stepped forward in the media (see Table 2). In 2013, however, both 
internal (Caucasian) and external (Central Asian) migrants were approxi-
mately equally likely subjects of discussion. So, in 2013, the media covered 
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the Caucasians in 151 articles (three times more than in 2008); Tajiks in 140 
articles (approximately two times more than in 2008); and, the Uzbeks in 111 
pieces of news (also twice as many as five years before). Far from a decline 
in the image of the migrant in the press, then, their number increased.
Table 2
Textual references to the ethnicity of migrants, 2008–2014
Year
Internal migrants Foreign migrants
Caucasians Tajiks Uzbeks





2008 .11 48 .15 65 .13 55
2009 .08 32 .14 61 .12 50
2010 .23 99 .12 51 .30 129
2011 .29 113 .22 84 .12 44
2012 .28 104 .27 99 .16 58
2013 .45 151 .42 140 .33 111
2014 .18 18 .23 24 .12 12
While the  number of  media articles involving discussion of  eth-
nic migrants increased, however, there was not a corresponding increase 
in the number of accusations of criminal activity associated with ethnic 
minorities. In other words, the concentrated poison of ethnic criminality was 
dissolved in a larger pool of neutral references. Thus, the overall impression 
created by the media is one of a relative decline over time of the stereotypes 
purported to generate violence.
The sole spike in the data, as Table 2 demonstrates, came after 2012 and 
reached its peak in 2013, the year of the Mayor of Moscow election. As men-
tioned above, one of the salient features of the mayoral campaign was that four 
out of six candidates (Sobyanin, Yavlinsky, Naval’nyi, and Mel’nikov) focused 
on the issue of legal and illegal migration to Moscow. All included measures 
to combat illegal migration in their electoral programs [Moskva24, 2013]. 
For example, Naval’nyi who has been periodically criticized by the liberal 
community of Russia for making overtures to nationalism, said in one of his 
interviews on the sole liberal television station, Dozhd TV: ‘We have an im-
mense problem with migrants in Moscow and we will never solve it if we do 
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not establish a visa regime with countries of Central Asia and Transcaucasia’ 
[Osharov, 2013]. Moreover, Naval’nyi stated that more than half of the crimes 
were committed by migrants from Central Asia and in case he would win, 
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Graph 1. Textual references to “migrants & crime”  
and “ethnic & crime”, 2008–2014
This section has provided evidence of both official and popular disso-
ciations with the idea of ‘ethnic criminality’ in the period after 2010. On 
the official level, although senior politicians have publicly rebuked connec-
tions between migrants and crime, it took until 2012 for them to do so. This 
was despite opportunities to dissociate migrants and crime at the height 
of the skinhead wave of violence. On the popular level, the association be-
tween ethnicity and criminality has also declined, even though references 
to ethnic groups and migrants increased over the same period. The evidence 
thus suggests that while state entities were working on cure, they also sought 
to prescribe remedies to the disease in the first place.
Conclusion
Thus, the article offers reflections on the role of the media in generating 
anti-migrant sentiment. Within the Russian print media, attitudes towards 
ethnic migrants are divided because they reflect the assessment of differ-
ent aspects of the migrants’ culture. Employers mainly assess the qualities 
of migrants in terms of a labor culture, emphasizing such things as their 
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promptness and modest demands. Businesses are interested in financial gain, 
so they hire low-paid migrants and provide a liberal assessment in the mi-
gration discourse. For locals (and journalists reflecting their viewpoint), 
however, the public behavior of migrants is important. If migrants display 
patterns of behavior very different from those habitual in society it tends 
to provoke negative attitudes to migrants and a conservative contribution 
to the discourse. The authorities are mainly interested in maintaining stability, 
so they do not articulate their stand on the migration issue precisely. The net 
result is to produce an ambivalent attitude to ethnic migrants, but one which 
after 2010 downplayed the earlier purported connection between migrants 
and crime. This implies that while negative attitudes toward ethnic others 
and migrants continue, so hate crimes may reappear as a significant feature 
of Russian society at some point in the future.
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